The full inside story of how Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran

But the JC can reveal that the explosive device placed under his bed was planted by two Iranians recruited by the Mossad from the Ansar al-Mahdi security unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the very people who were supposed to secure the building and its guests.

The Iranians themselves realised this after the assassination, when the guards were seen on security camera footage on the day of the assassination moving stealthily in the hallway towards the room where Haniyeh planned to stay, opening the door with a key and entering the room.

Three minutes later the guards (who were offered a six-figure sum each as well as immediate relocation to a northern European country) were captured on camera calmly leaving the room, going down the stairs towards the main entrance of the building, leaving and then getting into a black car. The guard at the parking lot checkpoint recognised them and opened the gate without asking any questions. An hour later they were smuggled out of Iran by the Mossad.

The building where Haniyeh was staying

Reports have suggested that the device was placed in Haniyeh’s room weeks or months before the explosion. This is wrong. Security cameras show it was placed on the day of the explosion, at 4:23 pm – some nine hours before it was activated when Haniyeh entered his room. The explosion, which was set off remotely by a robot, took place after midnight, at exactly 01:37am local time.

To prevent possible detection, the Mossad planted a flat brick explosive, 3 inches wide by 6 inches long, that was fastened to the bottom of the bed. To minimise harming innocent civilians, they used a bomb known for its precision which targeted only Haniyeh’s room. As a result, only one specific area of the building was damaged (see the image on this page).

Iranians holding flags of Iran, Palestine, and Hezbollah (Photo by HOSSEIN BERIS/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images)

Haniyeh’s assassination, which was decided on after October 7, necessitated a complicated set of arrangements from a network of Mossad spies dispersed throughout Tehran, including local Iranian collaborators who had been active in Iran long before the Gaza War. Over the past 20 years Israel has been gathering intelligence about Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons. This intelligence, in addition to the recruitment of the two IRGC members enabled the success of the operation.

Following the decision to carry out Haniyeh’s assassination, the Mossad began searching for a suitable opportunity to strike. It emerged when Haniyeh was invited to Tehran for the new Iranian president’s inauguration. The Mossad, with the assistance of intelligence unit 8200 (the IDF unit responsible for clandestine operations), intercepted phone calls between the organisers of the inauguration and the invited guests. When Haniyeh confirmed his arrival, the Mossad began executing the plan: eliminate Haniyeh in the guest house where he usually stayed during his visits to Tehran.

Mossad then sent its own agents to visit the area regularly to supply the operational logistics, map every street and alleyway, identify potential escape routes and check the building’s security measures. But the agents encountered difficulties when arriving in the area. The guest house was perched on a hill and surrounded by a forest of towering trees, which made it very difficult to observe the building clearly. But Israeli improvisation and creativity then kicked in. Five agents dressed themselves in green clothing and simply climbed the trees closest to the building while camouflaged by the green colour of the trees. Now the view was clear for them.

Their role was to report as soon as Haniyeh arrived at the building, having memorised his car’s colour and license plate number. In the absence of a source inside the building who could inform them when Haniyeh had entered his room, another Mossad squad, also dressed in green, climbed into the branches of the trees and watched the building from an angle where the window of Haniyeh’s room was facing them. Their role was to notify the bomb operator as soon as the light went out in Haniyeh’s room.

At 01:20 all the invited guests arrived at the guesthouse. Haniyeh entered his room after exchanging goodbye hugs and handshakes, while his bodyguard stood outside his door to keep him safe. About 10 minutes later, the light was switched off, and a pastoral silence fell over the guest house area.

At that moment the bomb operator detonated an explosion that shook the entire structure. Haniyeh was killed immediately. His bodyguard, Wasim Abu Shaaban, was critically injured and subsequently died after heavy bleeding. (When his identity was checked by the Mossad before the operation they realised that the bodyguard was also a wanted terrorist – a senior member of Hamas’ military wing and one of the group of terrorists who had infiltrated Israel through a tunnel in 2014 and murdered five IDF soldiers.)

Following the assassination, Iranian security authorities raided the guesthouse compound, arresting 28 senior military officials, and headquarters personnel who were present. All their electronic gadgets were confiscated to search their communications. The Iranian agents scanned the entire facility inch by inch and analysed the security cameras frame by frame. When they discovered that members of the IRGC were involved, they were not surprisingly enraged. The next day, when they threatened to inflict serious punishment on Israel, this was as much to do with the humiliation as because of the death of a senior Hamas official they were hosting.

The Mossad had multiple opportunities to eliminate Haniyeh in Qatar. But Israel refrained from doing so because Qatar served as a vital negotiator between Hamas and Israel over the hostage crisis. Carrying out an assassination on Qatari soil might embarrass Qatar and jeopardise any future peace accord between Israel and Qatar that had been under discussion before the Gaza war.